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2 1.  INTRODT 'CTION 
Addressing the Year 2000 Computing (Y2K) Problem was a unique experience with a global 
scope. Government involvement occurred at the very highest levels,  yet  unusually, there was 
little competitive or  _political advantage to be gained. In- this arena, the Member States of the 
European Union each had their own individual roles to play in preparing for the century date 
· change.  This  report  highlights· the  main  activities  and  results  which  were  achieved  at  EU 
level, thrO'Jgh the·actions of EU Y2K Working Party and the European Commission.  · 
From the  outset,  it  was  recognised that the  nature and extent of the Y2K problem required 
everyone - whether individuals or organisations - to assess their own particular risks and to 
aCt  responsibly to ensure that they were adequately prepared.  At  the  same time,  it  was  also 
clear-that the most critical factor in achieving success on a global basis would be the exchange 
· of information. 
Initially,  the  focus .on. sharing  infc;>rmation  assisted  those who  were  actually  addressing  the 
problem.  As problems in  certain equipment and software were identified,  those who  started 
later  were  able  to  concentrate·  their  efforts  on  certain  areas  and  avoid  unneces-sary 
investigations. As the emphasis shifted, however, the need to have reliable information on the 
preparedness  of others  - customers,  partners,  critical  services  and  infrastructures,  arid 
eventually,  even  entire  trading  nations, . became  more  apparent.  Ultimately,  due  to  our 
increasing dependence on information technology (IT) in daily life and the interconnectedness 
and  interdependence of modern industry on a global scale,  in the final few  months of 1999, 
solving the Y2K problem became primarily an issue of maintaining public confidence. 
It is for this reason that governments throughout the world, whilst ensuring that their own IT 
systems were ready for 2000,  have also paid attention to  various other aspects - raising  the 
awareness  of their industry and  citizens to  the  nature of the  threat  posed  by  the  so-called 
"millennium  bug",  carrying  out  audits  and  publishing  comprehensive  information  on  the 
preparedness of their key infrastructure sectors, arid reviewing the resources and plans of civil 
protection authorities. 
Within the EU, the main forum for  cornrn~nication and the exchange of infor~ation on the 
Y2K problem between the  Member States was  the  European  Union  High  Level Working 
Party on the Y2K Problem (EUY2KWP). 
2.  . CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE EU- THE EUY2K WORKING PARTY 
2.1.  Background 
The Year 2000 Computing Problem certainly received a very high level of political attention 
in  the EU.  In June  1998, the Cardiff European Council conclusions highlighted the need  to 
share  information on this  issue and to  monitor progress.  Subsequent European Councils  in 
Vienna and Cologne continued to follow the evolution of the problem very closely, focusing  · 
particularly on potential cross-border risks. Discussions also took place at ministerial level in 
various  oth~r Councils;  including  Industry,  Telecommunications,  Transport,  Energy,  and 
Finance. Its diverse nature necessitated the involvement of many different sectors, thus it was  · 
difficult to identify a single existing organisation with the ability to deal with all aspects of the 
problem. 
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.• J:he  Commission had  also  been active,  organising  quarterly  wor~shops mvo1vmg  1viemoer 
State  representatives  and  participants  from  European  industry,.i·associations  starting  in 
September  1997.  Despite  the  usefulness  of  these  workshops';  there  were  also  certain 
·limitations.  The  mixture  of  industry  .and  ·administrators  occasionally  prevented  MS 
representatives from focusing on their particularinformation sharing needs. Furthermore, the 
experience  and  background  of  MS  representatives  was  not  consistent,  thus  not  all 
representatives  had  similar .  responsibilities  and  knowledge  of the  issues.  The  mandate  of 
. workshop  participants  was  unofficial,  and  ~nderstood to  be  primarily  the  gathering  and 
exchanging of information, and not setting policy or _taking decisions. 
The need  for  a  specific .group to  handle  Y2K matters  at  EU !evel  was  identified  by  tbe 
. Cologne European Council in  June  1999.  The Presidency conclusions  (§36)  requested  the  · 
Commission  to  convene  a  High  Level  Group  to  " ...  put forward  proposal~ for  strategic 
decisions which-may be required within the European Union to ensure theproperfunctiorzing 
. of  essential areas of infrastructures should computer problems arise  in  connection with  the 
change of  millennium." 
The Commis.sion responded to this request by convening the first meeting of the EUY2KWP 
in July 1999. During this initial meeting, it was agreed that the group would focus  ~pecifically 
on cross-border issues associated with essential areas of infrastructure and related services. 
These areas were defined as being those which ensure the normal functioning of society and 
the economy, particularly aspects relating to the continued safety and wellbeing of citizens. 
The  sectors. of potential  interest  included_ energy,  transport,  telecommunications,  water, 
finance,  supply  chains,  healthcare,  welfare,  customs,  and  civil  protection.  The  EFT  A 
countries were invited to partieip~te as observers, and  act~vely contributed to the group. 
2.2.  Results 
The group met on a monthly basis during the second,half of 1999. In general, the topics for 
discussion  at  each  meeting  were  agreed  during  the  prev:ious  meeting,  which  ~llowed the 
-.representatives to prepare themselves and obtain information from national experts in specific 
sectors  in  advan<;:e.  The  members  illso  agreed  to  communicate  and  take  decisions,  if 
necessary, by electronic means. To this end, the Commission established a dedicated private 
internet forum. Between meetings, electronic communication and-consultation were routine. 
It  was  recognised  that  normal  EU  deCision-making ·procedures  ·would- -generally  be 
inappropriate, as  they would not accommodate the  quick response  times required for Y2K 
matters.  Instead,  it ·was  decided  that  any  agreements  reached · within  the  group  would  by 
achieved through consensus, and would then be implemented nationally as required. 
.  .  . 
During  its  meetings,  the EUY2KWP dealt with a very wide-ranging  set of topics,  and the 
results of their discussions in key areas are summarised under the relevant dorriains.  ' 
· 2.2.1.  Nuclear Safety · 
An i~portant topic raised at every meeting was the subject of nuclear safety. Within the EU, 
the preparedness of nuclear power plants (NPPs) within the EU was closely monitored a:nd 
information was readily available. H9wever, uncertainty regarding'.the situation of CEEC and 
NIS plants was created by the overall lack of information coming from these countries and 
their close geographical proximity, making this a matter of particular concern in many EU 
countries. 
4 
I 
.  \ The group asked  the  Commission to  take  action  on two fronts.  Firstly,  they requested the 
Commission to provide as much information as possible on the actual situ'ation 'of the nuclear 
sector in  these  countries.  The  Commission reacted  by  collecting  information  from  various 
sources,  including  from  the  regular  meetings  held  between  EU  and  CEEC/NIS  nuclear 
regulators as well as the IAEA, which had conducted site visits in these countries. 
It was apparent that Y2K was very unlikely to pose a direct threat to the safety of power plant 
operations, since no  safety criticai systems were known to be affected in any  nuclear power 
plant.· Instead, since certain less critical monitoring systems were potentially involved, there 
was · a  need  to  ensure  that  plant  safety  would  not  be  degraded  over  the  longer  term  by 
probler,ns. _ 
The Commission was thus asked to provide funding to assist nuclear operators.to address the 
problem.  In  this  instance,  the  Commission already  supported the  IAEA  work,  as  wetl  as 
funding the ISTC, STCU, and W  ANO to provide on-site assistance to Russian and Ukrainian 
power  plants.  Following  the  urging  of  the  EUY2KWP,  a  separate  budget  of  some 
3 million euro  was  identified  to  fund  remaining  needs  for  assistance  during  2000.  As  of. 
May 2000, it  appears that the majority of the budget allocated to  Russia and Ukraine will  · 
indeed be needed to correct problems in nuclear power plants. 
2.2.2.  Energy 
The  subject· of energy,  and  specifically its  production and  distribution,  was  also  regularly 
raised within the group. Much attention was given to electricity, as an energy source which 
cannot be stored. The stability of electricity grids in CEEC and NIS countries, as  well as  the 
reliability of electricity in general, and of gas and oil supplies coming from outside the EU, 
were considered. 
The interest in electricity grids concentrated on the potential for  a  grid  failure  to  have  an 
impact on NPP stability, and also the possibility of humanitari@.n consequences arising from a 
widespread lack of heating during January.(see section 2.2.9). As  with NPPs, concerns were 
primarily focused  on the CEEC and  NIS  countries.  The Commission held  a conference  in 
July 1999 on electricity grids, with the participation ofEU, CEEC, and NIS operators, to raise 
awareness of  this threat and to exchange information on how it was being addressed. 
In terms of other energy sources, various aspects were discussed, including tbe status of the 
NATO oil pipelines,. which transport a large proportion of the  aviation  fuel  to  most  major 
airports  and  bases  in  Western  Europe.  The  Commissio~ reported  that  NATO. had  been 
working on its  pipeline system remediation for ·nearly three  years,  with  the system having 
been fully tested and contingency measures put in place. The group was also informed of the 
oil supply contingency plans developed by the International Energy Agency (lEA). 
With  regard  to  gas  production  .and  distribution,  the  need . for  a  closer  co-ordination  at 
European  level  was  identified.  The  EU  also  relies  heavily  on  foreign  gas  supplies.  The 
Norwegians participated in  the  activities of the EUY2KWP,  keeping  other countries  fully 
informed of their activities. Italian sources reported on the status of Algerian suppliers, while 
Finnish and German administrators were able to provide reassurance regarding the status of 
GAZPROM in Russia. 
5 2.2.3.  Air transport 
Due to  its  nature,  aviation was  generally handled at an  international level by the regulators 
through  the  International Civil Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO),  and  by- various  operators 
through the International Air Transport Association (lATA). Within the EU, Eurocontrol was 
involved in co-ordinating contingency planning for several EU countries.  -
Thus the particular aspect which. was discussed within the EUY2KWP ~oncerned the potential 
need to ban certain non-compliant operators from flying  into EU countries,  and  possibly to. 
prevent national operators from flying  to  countries where the readiness of air traffic control 
systems was in doubt. The intention of these discussions was to try to avoid the ac;loption by 
Member  States  of contradictory .  positions.  Possible  arrangements  were  discussed  as ·the 
rollover period moved closer and information on particular carriers and  c·ountri~s was shared. 
However,  as  it  happened,  no  country decided. to take  such  action and  thus  a co-ordirthted 
. action at EU level proved to be  ~nnecessary. 
2.2.4.  Maritime transport 
In the maritime domain, there were two key issues having an impact beyond national borders. 
Firstly, there was a need to. ensure a consistent policy to deal with ships in EU waters or ports 
which had not declared their preparedness for Y2K in conformance with the guidelines issued 
by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In this atea, the contingency plans which 
each EU Member. State had developed to  cope with their own situation were compared, and 
found to be compatible.  ·  · 
Secondly, the readiness of individuai EU ports, and also customs  ~rid immigration systems  in~ 
general, was of vital importance in  ensuring that supply chains would  continue  to  function 
normally.  Overall,· the  ~in EU  ports  were  well  aware  of the  threat  posed  by  the  Y2K 
problem  .and  were  felt  to  be  prepared.  There  are  also · a  number  of community-wide 
information  technology  systems  used  to  exchange  data  for  the  purposes  of the  Internal 
Market. The  Commission itself undertook substantial efforts to ensure,  in co-operation with 
MS, that these systems were remediated. 
2.2.5.  Fit:tance 
· The financial sector was particularly .threatened by the Y2K problem, due to its heavy reliance 
upon information technology systems and the inherent global and interconnected nature of its 
business.  In response, the world's financial cominunity, both the public and private sectors, 
undertook an  enormous, and ultimately  very successful,  collaborative  effort  to  address  the 
problem.  The  EU  financial  institutions benefited substantially from the  introduction of the 
euro, particularly when defining-contingency plans for the rollover period. 
The quality and scppe of the existing international collaboration thus made it unnecessary for 
the EUY2KwP to consider specific actions regarding cross-border issues in the financial area. 
The impact of Y2K on'  insurance policies and claims was discussed.-EU countries discussed 
the legislation on Y2K and iegal liability introduced in· the US;  but took the view that there 
was no  need  for similar legislation in any EU country due to the absence of certain aspects 
specific  to the US  legal  system,  including  the  less  litigious  nature  generally  prevalent  m 
theEU. 
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Similarly,  the  tetecommunication  domain,  being  an  inherently  global  and  interconnected 
sector, also required an  international response. In this case,  it was primru:ily the ,International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) which took responsibility for  informing their  members of 
the·  need  to  take  action,  providing  direct  assistance  by  carrying  out  workshops  in  less. 
developed regions.  They  also  co-ordinated international testing efforts designed to  test  the 
Y2K compliance of the main technologies used throughout the world.  . 
Telecom regulators and operators throughout Europe were strongly involved in ITU activities. 
Unique to the telecommunication sector is the "normal" pattern of heavy demand experienced 
at  the  beginning of each New  Year.  In this  instance,  the  coincidental arrival  of 2000  was 
expected to  further exacerbate this situation. The EUY2KW'P members identified a need for 
operators  to  take  this  into  account  in their  rollover  plans,  and  to  ensure  that  emergency 
telecommuniCation services continued to operate normally. 
2.2. 7.  Y2K lnfonnation Policy 
Another issue  also  discussed  was  the  importance  of having  a consistent  Y2K information 
policy. This had various aspects - the exchange of information on the EU situation with other 
governments, the publication of information aimed at the EU public and industry, and finally, 
reporting on third country preparedness. 
The EU:Y2KWP endorsed the need to have regional representation in the Steering Committee 
of  the  Washington-based  International  Y2K  Co-operation  Centre  and  requested  the 
Commission to fulfil this role.  The Commission responded to  this request by nominating  a 
representative to the  IY2KCC,  and  it  also  ensured that the  EU  was· represented  iri  various 
other international fora dealing with this subject, such as ICAO, the IMO, the lEA, the IAEA, 
and the G8 Expert Group on Y2K, as well. This ensured that the EUY2KWP were regularly 
informed of the numerous activities taking place in various sectors at international level, and 
also that other participants in these for;:t  were aware of the actions being carried out within 
theEU. 
In terms of  the provision of information to the public, it was evident th~t each Member State 
needed  to  take into  account the  particular needs  of their citizens and  develop an  approach 
which  was  best  suited  to  their  national  situation.  However,  all  MS  saw  the  value  of 
exchanging detailed information on their ideas and plans with each other, and ensuring that 
there  was  consistency  throughout  the  EU  in  the  information  which  was  provided  on · 
infrastructures with a cross-border nature. 
Regarding the publication of information on third countries, it was proposed that the EU MS 
should pool the information which they had obtained on the preparations in countries outside 
the Union and have this published jointly through the Commission.  Whilst recognising the 
importance of having such information made available to the EU public, the greatest concern 
wa~ to ensure that such published information should be accurate, reliable and well balanced. 
It was considered that this would be impossible to guaranteein such a complex domain where 
the  actual  situation  was  constantly  evolving .. Furthermore,  it  was  not  clear  that  the 
Commission itself had  a mandate to  publish  such material concerning  individual countries· 
outside the Union.  A decision was therefore taken that  in  this  instance, the Member States 
would act if they so chose on an individual basis. 
7 2.2.8.  The EU Communication Centre 
All EU Member States. decided to create "early warning" or monitoring platforms at national, 
and  often regionaL and  local,  levels.  These platforms  varied ·considerably in  t~rms of their 
resourcing and methodology, but were generally intended to reinforce existing mechanisms to· 
respond  in  the  event of serious  disruptions  following  midnight on  th~ 31  December  1999. 
Most closely tracked the date rollover on a global scale,  to take advantage of any advance 
warning of problems,  and  provided  information aimed· at the public· regarding  the  national 
situation. 
.  .  . 
· The Commission was requested to provide a mechanism for private communication between 
Member  States  during  this  period,  which  was  also  used  to  monitor  reports ·corning  from 
critical sectors and countries in order to  rapidly identify any potential problem which could 
require a reaction from the Commission itself. In addition to the work undertaken to prepare 
its own systems for the Y2K problem, the Commission thus established the European Union 
Y2K  Monitoring  and  Communication  Centre  (EUY2KCC).  The  Centre  was  staffed  by 
Commission officials. with knowledge of the  Y2K problem and  of the  vital  sectors. which 
could be affected, and fully equipped with access to various media. It operated on a 24 hour 
basis from 31  December 1999 at 10:00 until3 January 2000 at20:00 (Brussels time). 
2.2.9.  Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
The EU national authorities for civil protection shared their plans for the rollover period on 
various  occasions,  including  during  specific  Y2K  workshops  and  regular  meetings  of 
Directors-General and committees. In each Member State, the civil protection authorities were 
in  a higher state of readiness to react at year end than is  normal, supported by enhanced and 
thoroughly  testing  contingency plans  designed  to .cope  with  any  potential  Y2K-induced 
emergency .. 
The  Commission  itself operates  three  permanent  alert  systems  for  disasters.  They  cover 
nuclear accidents (ECURIE), maritime accidents, and civil protection: For these systems, the 
Y2K transition was regarded as  a special situation.  Although they were on 'constant· alert as 
usual,  they were also  linked  with the  Y2K Centre of the  Commission,  and  three Heads  of 
Units and ·the Environment Commissioner were all on call and available to respond urgently if 
necessary. As it happened, Commission emergency systems instead became very involved in 
dealing with the Erika disaster, as well as the violent storms affecting France and a number 9f 
other Member States.  ·  · 
The potential need  for  humanitarian aid  to  cope  with  Y2K-related disasters  in  developing 
countries was  primarily ·discussed  by the 08 group  and  within the  appropriate  fora  of· the 
United Nations.  In the EU, ECHO, the EU Humanitarian Aid  Office,  confirmed that iC was 
al_so  prepared to react to  any Y2K-related emergency in the same manner as  it would to·any 
other event. 
· 3.  THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE COMMISSION TO ADDRESSING THE Y2K COMPUTING 
PROBLEM 
3.1.  Role and Mandate 
_The root of the Y2K problem was a technical problem which could only be solved by each 
organisation individually. Nevertheless, the extent of the problem and the need to ensure that 
both the public and industry alike were well informed of its implications and the need to take 
'- ~  . 
8 individual action ensured that public administrations became strongly involved. Similarly, the 
potential for the problem to have an impact beyond national borders created a requirement to 
address certain issues at EU level. 
The exchange of information betweenjndustries and the public sector throughout the EU was 
necessary to share experiences ani::l to understand the preparedness of others. Moreover, many 
key infrastructures in the EU, including transport, energy, finance,  and  telecommunications, 
are inherently international in nature and have aspects which cross national boundaries. Thus 
there  were  issues  where  decisions  needed  to  be  taken which  would  affect  ~egulators and  _ 
operators in several countries. 
It was for these reasons that the Commission became actively involved in assisting others to 
address the problem, at the same time ensuring that its own IT systems were well prepared. It 
did  so  in  various  ways  -·through participation in  international fora  and  Y2K-related events 
throughout  the  world,  hosting  its  own  workshops  and  meetings  with  MS  authorities, 
producing  status  reports  on  the  EU  situation,  and  ultimately,  establishing  a  Y2K 
communication centre at EU level which operated throughout the critical period during the 
changeover. 
3.2.  _·  Organisation 
Within the  Cominission,  it  was  the  former  Directorate  General  III  for  Industry  (now  DG 
Enterprise) which acted as chef de  file  for this particular is_1;ue.  This choice was  made at an 
earJy  stage  where  the nature of the  problem was  considered to  be  essentiall~ technical  in 
nature.  At  the  time,  DG  III  was  responsible  for  certain  areas  of the  4
1  Framework 
Programme, notably the IT programme, where the responsibility for research projects looking 
· at  ways  to  solve  the  problem  was  located.  The  main  expertise  for  the  topic  was  thus 
considered to lie within DG III. 
· Once the potential impact on major infrastructures became more apparent, it quickly became 
necessary to integrate the efforts of many other DGs as  well.· A vital factor in the success of 
the Commission's efforts to  address the problem was  the core team of knowledgeable  and 
dedicated Commission personnel who formed the Y2K lnterservice Group (Y2K ISG). The 
.group actively began to work together at the beginning of 1999,  although  many had been 
addressing aspects of the Y2K problem in their specific sectors for months beforehand. The 
complementary expertise of the group members and the degree of collaboration demonstrated 
in working together towards common goals was exemplaryfor the Commission. 
3.3.  Reporting 
The most problematic aspect of the Commission's work on the Y2K subject was the delivery 
of the status reports which it produced at the request of Council and Parliament. Status reports 
were compiled on the basis of information provided in a common format by Member States in 
March, June, and September of 1999.  · 
Not  surprisingly,  Member  States  were  collecting  and  reporting  similar  information  for 
national purposes throughout the year as  well,  thus  all those dealing with the Y2K problem 
were extremely busy and the national reporting timetables rarely coincided with those at EU  .  . 
levyl.  Reports often arrived several weeks  late and  in various languages.  At the same time, 
supple?lentary information was also being collated by the Y2K ISG members for their own 
sectors, and the integration of all these sources of information into a coherent whole was also 
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a  task  which  required  substantial  effort.  The  national  Y2K  co-ordinators  also . had  the 
opportunity to review draft report~. 
·!(every step is completed without delay to normal timescales, the earliest date of publication 
. for  sQch  a  comrimnication · which  could  be -envisaged  is  approximately  . 3  months. 
Nevertheless,  the  final  report for  quarter 3,  having  received top priority in the translation 
process, was adopted during the first w:eek of December, and thus only took 10 weeks in total 
to be published.  · 
It is clear that the process for adopting official Commission communications is not well suited 
to the rapid publication of primarily factual status reports.  Should a similar need for factu'al· .-
reporting to Council and Parliament arise in the future, other options should be considered to  . 
allow a.more responsive timetable. Since by farthe greatest  delay is incurred in·the translation 
process, a reduction in the number of language versions could-be considered.  Furtherrrlore, 
insofar as_ a status report is an essentially factual document based upon information obtained 
from MS  authorities  and  has  no  political  ramifications,  there  is  no  significant  additional· 
benefit achieved by having the approval of'the College. In this case, it should be suffiCient to 
reach agreement within the servi~es concerned. 
' 
3.4.  International Co-operation· 
Various aspects of the Y2K problem needed to be dealt with at EU and international level. 
\Vithin the EU itself, meetings organised by the Commission provided the natural forum for 
both MS  authorities  and  industry  to  share  information.  General  discussions  at EU level 
initiillly  took place  within Y2K workshops,  and  from  July  1999,  in  the  meetings  of the 
EUY2KWP. However, sectors also tended to hold their own meetings in both regional ano 
international  fora.  The  Commission  was  represented  by  sectoral  experts  from  various · 
Directorates  General in  many .  such meetings,  acting  as  an intermediary both to  exchange 
information  on  the  EU situation  to- those outside  the  EU and  to  provide  information on 
external.activities to the Member States. 
Apart  from  the  sectoral  organisations;  the  Coffimi.ssion  actively  participated  in  several 
meetings on Y2K hosted by the Informatics Working Group of the  United Nations,  in the 
steering committee of  the International Y2K Co-operation Center,  and  in -the  Y2K Expert 
Group ofthe G8. In these areas,  the Commission acted as an intermediary,  facilitating  the 
flow  of information  regarding  the· EU  situation  to  other  countries,  and· reporting  on the 
progress and activities of various countries and organisations to EU representatives. _ 
3~5.  Website 
For a topic such as the Y2K problem, with the core involvement of information technology, 
the Internet became an essential source of up  .. to-date information. Given the constant progress 
of each' organisation and the rapid evolution of issues and plans, the only media which could 
keep up with an ever-changing situation was the Internet. Thousands of Y2K websites were 
created worldwide and  e-mail lists. with global· Y2K experts ensured  a  close collaboration . 
between technicians addressing the problem. The work of the. IYCC and the G8 group was 
greatly facilitated by electronic communication. Information on the Internet clarified technical 
issues,  provided  insight  into  new, aspects of  the  problem,  gave specific examples of early 
problems in 1999, as well as giving· an impression of how. the problem was perceived by the 
press and the public;.  · 
10 For more than 2 years, the Commission itself maintained a website on the Information Society 
Project Office server, which linked to many useful sources of information on various aspects 
of the  Y2K problem.  A specific  focus  was  given  to  informa,tion  provided by  EU Member 
States, the  majority of whom had  national Y2K websites,  and  international information on 
critical- sectors  provided by  industry  associations.  All  Commission  documents  relating  to 
Y2K,  including  the  minutes  of the  various  works~hops and  o'fficial  communications,  were 
published on the website. Towards the end of 1999, the website received tens of thousands of 
hits each month. It  was also the recipient of several awards. 
The Y2K Computing Problem was  also  chosen as  to be  represented  as  a key  issue  on the 
Commission's Europa website during the final4 months of 1999. This provided an overview 
of the  problem  aimed  at  EU  citizens  in  all  community  languages,  directing  visitors  to 
numerous other sources of information. 
The  Internet also  acted  as  a vital information  and  communication tool  during  the  rollover 
'period itself at year end.  Dedicated websites such as  the Global Status Watch (GSW),  were 
hosted  by  the  IY2KCC  and  fed  by  information  from  national  Y2K  platforms.  The 
Commission provided  a  mirror of the  GSW website  in  order to  give  Europeans  a  better 
chance to  access  up-to:-date  and reliable  information on the status of. critical infrastructures 
throughout the world.  At year end,  150 000 visits (hits) were registered in  less than 3 days, 
-about  20%- of the  total  for  the  GSW  system,  indicating  a  considerable  level  of interest. 
Numerous private websites were also operational during the changeover period to exchange 
information,  including  the  YEWS 
1  website  operated  by  the  US-Nuclear  Regulatory 
Commission (US-NRC) which provided reports from NPP operators throughout the world. 
The site and  its  material has  continued to  be  available for  reference during  2000.  It is  the 
intention to shut down the site and archive its material in June 2000. 
3.6.  Workshops 
From the  beginning, the Commission recognised the  benefits of information exchange  and_ 
thus  a key  focus  of activity was  the  workshops  which  were  organised  at  EU level.  In  the 
beginning,  these workshops took place on a quarterly basis and involved both industry and 
EU authorities.  The value of these  workshops was  such that speakers freely provided their 
services and all participants willingly paid their own expenses to attend. 
At  the  request  of the  Vienna  European Council,  the  Commission  organised  a  meeting  in 
April 1999 with the providers of EU critical infrastructures in Brussels, with an emphasis on 
cross-border and cross-sector Y2K issues. Over 150 participants, including national Y2K co-
ordinators,  regulators,  and  representatives  of both  international  associations  and  industry, 
shared- information  on  their  progress  and  concerns  relating- to  the  aviation,·  maritime, 
electricity,  gas,  telecommunications,  and  nuclear  power  sectors.  Th,is  forum  provided  a 
valuable  opportunity for  the  various  sectors in  each EU country to  inform others of their 
progress  and  plans.  The  need  to  encourage  better  communication  between  the  different 
infrastructure sectors at local, national and international level was identifiefJ as a major issue. 
The  dependency  between  electricity -grids  and  nuclear  power  plants  and  the  lack  of 
information regarding  the  situation in  Central and  Eastern European (CEEC)  countries,  as 
well as the Newly Independent States (NIS), led to the organisation of a specific workshop on  · 
EWS: Y2K Early Warning System. 
11. this  topic,  which  was  held  .in  July  1999.  Participants  from  the  electricity  industry  and  · 
government  authorities  with  responsibility  for  regulating  this  sector  from  more  than 
25 countries  met  together to  share  their experiences and  make  contacts to  provide  mutual. 
assistance. 
A second workshop with. European infrastructure providers took place  in  September 1999, 
providing a further opportunity to share information between sectors and countries prior to the 
rollover.  In this  instance,  the  200 participants  included  representatives  from  35  EU,  EEA, 
CEEC, and  NIS countries.  A focus  was placed on contingency plans and  strategies for  the 
rollover  period  itself,  including  communication  with  the  public  and  the  preparations  of 
national emergency services.  · 
It is important to note that due to _the time constraints and  without a specific budget for Y2K . 
activities  •. all these workshops were organised by the Commission itself, with the invaldable 
assistance of Member States and EU industry. The programme was agreed with MS Y2K co-
ordinators, who  helped  to  identify speakers and partiCipants.  Within the Commission, each ' 
DG concerned organised the sessions relating to their particular sector, chairing the panel and 
.  providing a reporter to summarise the results.  . 
In this manner, the Commission was able to draw upon both internal and external resources 
with a very little financial expenditure in order to  attract a large  number of knowledgeable 
participants and obtain substantial and relevant information. Workshop minutes were able to 
be rapidly compiled and published on  the Commission's Y2K website immediately after each 
event.  ContaCts  between  the  various  industry  sectors  and  experts  in  other  countries 
substantially improved co-ordination and co-operation within the EU. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Solving the Y2K problem has required a  comprehe~sive', sustained and  unprecedented level 
of collaboration  at  international  level,  involving  both  the  public  and  private  sectors.  The 
interest provided by  international groups,  including  the G8  and  the International Y2K Co-
operation Centre (IYCC), ensured that Y2K was given a high political profile and contributed 
to  raising  awareness,  convincing  governments ·and organisations of the  seriousne'ss  of the 
issue and of the need to take action~ 
Within  the  EU,  the  activities of the  EUY2KWP  and  the  Commission  have  thus -made  a 
significant contribution. The EUY2KWP provided an important forum in which the national 
co-ordinators of the EU Member States were able to discuss common issues and ensure that 
they remained well informed of the situation in various s.ectors and  oth~r countries in a very 
open and transparent manner.  '  ·  · 
The work of the EUY2KWP did not result in  major policy decisions.  Instead,  governments 
and officials shared. information on their strategies and activities over a period of months with 
·each other. The EU and EFf  A countries adopted a consistent  and  compatible approach to 
handling cross-border issues, even though they may have differed in the way in which they 
handled the Y2K problem on a national basis.  . 
Thu,s  it can be considered_ that the EUY2KWP has contributed substantially to ensuring this 
consistency.  There . can  be  little  doubt  that  the  exchange  of  information  provided  an 
opportunjty to learn from each other, and to develop and refine ideas together. In this sense 
alone, the relatively moqest expend_iture in terms oftime and travel to meet t~gether with·each 
12 other has  been a  wise  investment.  In  particular,  the  simple  but  effective  communication 
structure  which  was  implemented  to  permit  the  exchange  of information  between  MS 
authorities,  as  well  as  key  industry  sectors,. during  the  Y2K  rollover  was  a  significant 
achievement. 
At  another level,  it  is  also  true that there are lessons to be  learned for the  future  from the 
manner  in  which  different  countries  were  able  to  work  constructively  together  to  face  a 
common problem, and  the actual results which were achieved. The particul'!f circumstances 
surrounding this  probl~m were unique in  many ways - a pervasive, although unquantifiable, 
threat known in advance to organisations throughout the world,  with possible economic· and 
safety consequences, a fixed deadline, and notably, not involving strong national competitive · 
interests. 
Nevertheless,  the  dl(gree  of  openness  and  transparency  exhibited  by  governmencl  in 
communicating with each other,  the  facility  to circumvent or minimise  normally slow  and 
tedious  administrative  reactions  and  approvals,  the  modernisation  of IT  portfolios,  the 
development  of common  approaches  to  handle  cross-border  threats,  and  particularly  the 
establishment of contingency plans on an international basis in  many infrastructure sectors -
,all are achievements which may prove useful in the future. 
Few managers in industry or government will ever reg~d their IT systems in· quite the  same 
light  again.  Whereas  once- information  technology  may  have  been  regarded  as  simply  a 
valuable tool, it  is  now clear that it  is  a core asset on which the organisation depends for its 
continued operatjons. It is  ~ritical, however,  that the plans and achievements resulting  from 
Y2K should be recognised and  maintained for  the future.  It would  be  deeply regrettable  if  .  . 
much of the enormous collaborative effort and resources which went into their development 
were wasted due to  a lack of foresight  and care during the aftermath, as  attention naturally 
turns to other matters.  - · 
For the EU, the preparations for the imminent introduction of the euro as a real currency will 
certainly have been facilitated by the work which has gone into addressing the Y2K problem. 
Many will have addressed both problems simultaneously, others can take advantage of the 
better knowledge of their IT systems to prepare more easily. The financial sector has now had 
the experience of two rollovers - the introduction of the virtual euro in  1999 and the century 
date change of 2000, to co-ordinate testing and establish contingency plans which can be of 
benefit at the end of  2001. 
The Y2K problem served as an important reminder of the vital supporting role of information 
technology to  individual organisations and  global trading  as  a whole ..  During the  frrst  few 
months of 2000, topics such as secure electronic commerce, protection against "cyberattacks", 
as well as taxation' and personal privacy on the Internet, are all the subject of intensive debate 
at  national and  international levels.  These issues  share  many  characteristics  with  the  Y2K 
problem,  and  thus  c~m  also  potentially  benefit  from·  the  global  synergy  and  learning 
experiences developed in tackling Y2K. 
13 ISSN  0254-1475 
COM(200Q) 375  final 
J'  •••  DOCUMENTS 
EN  17  15  16  10 
Catalogue number : KT  -C0-00-350-EN-C -
Office for Official Publications ofthe European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
. \ 